This paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and emissions trading. We particularly analyze the long run equilibrium in a twosector ("clean" and "dirty") model with Cournot competition among …rms who face a …xed cost of production. The clean sector is de…ned as the sector with the highest long run cost margin on emissions. We compare the welfare implications of a cap-and-trade scheme with an emissions trading scheme based on relative intensity standards. It is shown that a …rm's long run equilibrium output in the clean or dirty sector does not depend on the emissions trading format, but only depends on the …xed cost of producing in the respective sector. Intensity standards can result in clean …rms selling allowances to dirty …rms, or dirty …rms selling to clean …rms. The former outcome yields higher welfare. It is demonstrated that cap-and-trade outperforms the intensity-based trading scheme in terms of long run welfare with free entry and exit. With intensity standards the size of the clean sector is too large.
Introduction
Governmental authorities increasingly embark upon emissions trading schemes to ef…ciently curtail environmental pollution. This paper analyzes and compares the two main market con…gurations for organizing trade in emission allowances: cap-and-trade versus intensity standards. Although tradable pollution markets have been studied extensively in recent years, a comparison of these pollution market designs in an imperfectly competitive, multi-sector model is still lacking. The aim of this paper is to …ll this gap by focusing on the connection between emissions trading and market structure. Since polluting industries are often concentrated in nature, we allow …rms to strategically interact in an imperfectly competitive output market and assess the sectoral implications of emissions trading in the long run equilibrium. Analyzing the interaction between emissions trading and output market e¤ects is an important dimension in policy assessments, since it is often not optimal to completely eliminate the pollution-intensive sector, even though reducing pollution is the underlying policy goal.
Cap-and-trade and intensity-based emissions trading represent schemes that are based on an absolute cap on emissions and on relative emission intensities, respectively.
Whereas under cap-and-trade a control authority …xes the total supply of emissions, in the case of intensity-based trading a source-speci…c level of emissions abatement is set, implying a …xed average emissions intensity (e.g., Tietenberg 1999) . Prime examples of cap-and-trade schemes in the U.S. are the acid rain programme and the RECLAIM programme to reduce sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from stationary sources in the Los Angeles basin. The European counterpart of large scale cap-and-trade currently occurs within the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) for carbon dioxide emissions (e.g., Ellerman and Buchner 2007) . In the 1980s the U.S. established intensity-based trading arrangements between re…neries as part of the lead phasedown (e.g., Hahn and Hester 1989; Kerr and Newell 2003) .
Another more recent intensity-based scheme is California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard (Holland et al. 2009 ). In Canada an intensity-based trading system was launched in 1996 under the Pilot Emission Reduction Target. This type of scheme is currently also one of the main design features of Canada's climate policy (Environment Canada 2007) . Also for developing countries intensity targets have been suggested (Philibert and Pershing 2000) , which has entered the post-Kyoto emissions trading design debate (e.g., Michaelowa et al. 2005 ; Jotzo and Pezzey 2007).
Our paper illustrates that entry and exit in the output market is a prime factor in the interplay between sectoral choice, production and emissions trading. We show that a …rm's equilibrium level of output in the long run does not depend on the speci…c design of the pollution market. Under either a no-policy regime, cap-and-trade or intensity standards, equilibrium output in the clean or dirty sector only depends on the …xed cost of producing in that sector. Due to the existence of …xed cost, in our model we illustrate that in the long run equilibrium a …rm's 'price-cost margin' is therefore positive, even with free entry and exit. For a given level of aggregate emissions in the long run, and given the zero-pro…t output level per …rm, we …nd that a cap-and-trade scheme generates higher welfare than emissions trading via intensity standards. Relative to the …rst-best outcome, the size of the clean (dirty) sector is too large (small) under the trading regime based on intensity standards.
These results complement and extend the …nding by Helfand (1991) , Fischer (2001) and Holland et al. (2009) that intensity standards are generally ine¢ cient, and the more recent studies by Boom and Dijkstra (2009) and Holland (2012) showing that in the absence of market power intensity standards cannot attain the …rst-best outcome whereas an absolute emissions trading scheme can. 1 Boom and Dijkstra (2009) …nd that the welfare comparison between the two schemes under imperfect competition is ambiguous in both the short run and the long run. By contrast, we …nd in our speci…c setting that cap-and-trade yields higher welfare in the long run.
Our welfare result may seem surprising in light of the literature. Boom and Dijkstra (2009) and Holland (2012) show that cap-and-trade maximizes welfare under perfect competition (in the short run and the long run), and emission trading based on an intensity standard does not. Boom and Dijkstra (2009) …nd that the welfare comparison is ambiguous under imperfect competition. On the one hand, if competition is 'close to' perfect, one would expect the perfect-competition result of higher welfare under capand-trade. On the other hand, output is higher under emissions trading via intensity standards, which counteracts the output-reducing tendency of imperfect competition.
The di¤erence in results stems from our assumption that the emission-to-output ratio in each sector is …xed. In Boom and Dijkstra (2009) this ratio is variable, so that with intensity standards the industry can expand its output while still implementing the pollution target by reducing its emission intensity. In the present paper, emissions trading on the basis of intensity standards leads to an output expansion in the clean sector and a (drastic) output reduction in the dirty sector. This is contrary to the optimal policy prescription, which is for both sectors to contract according to their relative emission intensities. The latter is exactly what cap-and-trade achieves.
Allowing for the presence of market power in the output sector, our study also adds to the literature that examines the interdependence between market structure and environmental policy. Seminal contributions in this domain are Buchanan (1969) and Barnett (1980) , which show that the optimal emission tax for a monopoly falls short of the marginal damage from pollution. 
Basic model
Consider an imperfectly competitive market consisting of n 2 …rms that choose output to maximize pro…t. Firms can choose to produce output in either one of two sectors i = c; d, with i = c referring to the clean sector and i = d to the dirty sector.
We shall de…ne 'clean'and 'dirty'at the end of this Section. For simplicity, we treat the number of …rms in each sector, n i ; as a continuous variable. Firm-level emissions e i > 0 are assumed to vary proportionally with …rm-level output q i > 0 for both goods:
with i > 0: Aggregate output produced by …rms in the clean and dirty sector is simply
with the two sectors facing the following inverse demand functions:
where p i is the price of good i. as its marginal cost of production, c i ; plus its cost of emissions from the extra output.
Without environmental policy, k i = c i : We shall see that with emissions trading based on an absolute cap and a relative intensity standard, k i is given by (16) and (25) respectively. Both with and without environmental policy, k i is a constant to the individual …rm.
We can now solve for the pro…t ( i )-maximizing output level of a …rm with full marginal cost k i and …xed cost F i . From (2):
with b Q i the aggregate output of all other …rms in sector i: The …rst-order condition is:
By symmetry, b Q i = (n i 1)q i so that the equilibrium quantities are:
Substituting (5) and b Q i = (n i 1)q i back into (3), pro…ts can be written as:
In the long run …rms exit from a sector when they incur losses, whereas pro…ts attract new …rms, until pro…t is driven to zero. Setting i = 0 in (6), we …nd:
Proposition 1 Absent environmental policy, or with emissions trading either in the form of an absolute cap or on the basis of relative intensity standards, the long run equilibrium output per …rm in sector i is:
Let us now complete the solution for the unconstrained benchmark, i.e., the long run equilibrium without environmental policy. Substituting k i = c i and (7) into (5) yields:
An interior equilibrium exists (e.g., n i > 0) if and only if:
where i can be seen as the long run cost margin on production. In the long run, each unit of output should not only cover its marginal production cost, but also contribute its share f i to cover the …xed cost, F i : Equations (7) to (9) then imply:
The total amount of emissions generated by the …rms in the clean and dirty sector in the unconstrained benchmark is:
where the second equality follows from (10).
We shall de…ne the clean sector as the sector with the greater long run cost margin
with i given by (9) and i by (1). This de…nition implies that when total emissions are below the unconstrained level (11) and the number of clean and dirty …rms is equal, clean production contributes more to welfare than dirty production. Hence, it is optimal to have more clean …rms than dirty …rms. 7 
Emissions trading
This section applies the model developed in the previous section to emissions trading on the basis of an absolute cap on emissions in the form of a cap-and-trade scheme (section 3.1) and emissions trading on the basis of a relative intensity standard (section 3.2). We denote these two emissions trading schemes by A and R, respectively.
We shall analyze and compare the trading schemes for a given level L of total emissions:
The second equality follows from Proposition 1. Throughout the analysis we assume
where the second equality follows from (11) . Condition (14) is necessary and su¢ cient for interior equilibria (with n c ; n d > 0) to exist with emissions trading under the two design con…gurations. 6 Since i is measured in money per unit of output i and i is measured in emissions per unit of output i; the long run cost margin on emissions, i = i ; is measured in money per unit of emissions. 7 This follows formally from equation (A5) given in Appendix A.3.
In order to ensure that p i > 0 (i = c; d) we shall assume:
Note that while we consider imperfect competition in the output market, it is assumed that …rms act as price takers in the tradeable pollution market. Although this may seem restrictive, it is a credible assumption and not in con ‡ict with the imperfectly competitive nature of the output market. For instance, the EU ETS for carbon emissions allows trade between …rms from di¤erent industries such as electric power plants, glass manufacturers, steel producers, the cement industry as well as …rms from the paper industry. The pollution market can therefore be competitive while competition in the respective output markets is imperfect.
Cap-and-trade
The regulator auctions allowances, each valid for one unit of emissions. The allowances in total sum up to the absolute cap, L, and the allowance price, v; is established on the pollution market. The pro…t-maximization problem of …rm i; taking the allowance price as given, can then be written as (3) with:
Equation (16) shows that the full marginal production costs under cap-and-trade, k A i ; equal marginal production costs, c i ; plus the cost of buying the allowances for the i emissions from the extra output. We see that a cap-and-trade policy increases the marginal cost of both the dirty and the clean …rm.
The cap is non-binding if it is greater or equal to the unconstrained level of emissions given by equation (11), i.e., if L E: A non-binding cap on pollution will result in an allowance price v = 0; a cap L < E is binding, implying that the allowance price v > 0: This ensures that the demand for allowances is equal to its supply shown in (13) . Using (5), (7), (13) and (16), we can now solve for n 
where E is the unconstrained emission level given by (11) .
The long run equilibrium number of …rms is:
Since n A i is increasing in L < E; we have:
By (12), n A c in (18) 
The second equality follows from (11) . (14) is therefore a su¢ cient condition for (20) to hold, meaning that the cap is su¢ ciently lax such that both the clean and dirty sector coexist.
Let us illustrate our …ndings with a speci…c numerical example where:
so that c = d = = 200 by (9) and q c = q d = f = 8 by (7). To simplify the graphical exposition, we assume that the two sectors are identical except for their emissions-tooutput ratios. Figure 1 shows the inverse demand curve for sector i = c; d as p i (Q i ) and the long run average production costs as c + f: The unconstrained benchmark is at point B with Q i = 200; p i = 100; n i = 25 and E = 600: Figure 1 illustrates the long run cap-and-trade equilibrium for our numerical example (21). 8 We take as our starting point a certain value of Q d as the equilibrium value of total dirty good production for a certain exogenous emission cap L (with the value
of L yet to be inferred). We wish to know what would be the equilibrium value of Q c that goes with this value of Q d : Once we have established the equilibrium combination of Q d and Q c ; we can infer the associated exogenous level of L from (13) and (21):
Returning to the question of what is the equilibrium value of Q c for a given equilibrium value of Q d ; this follows from (18) and (21) with Q i = n i f i ; i = c; d: Figure 1 shows the p 
Intensity standards
In contrast to a cap-and-trade system, consider now the case where the government sets a pollution intensity standard i for sector i = c; d: Under such an intensity-based trading system, if a …rm wants to emit more per unit than the standard allows, it can buy allowances from …rms that emit less per unit than the standard allows. The result is that, on average, the economy as a whole complies with the emission standard but the individual …rm has the ‡exibility to deviate from it. With our speci…cation However, there is no reason why the regulator should adopt this de…nition of a unit and set i = : We therefore allow c to di¤er from d . 9 The pro…t-maximization problem of …rm i; taking the allowance price under intensity standards, w; as given, can then be written as (3) with:
The full marginal production costs under intensity standards, k Substituting (25) and (7) into (5), we …nd:
Using (7), the pollution market clears via the constraint: 
as the revenue per unit of output that a …rm in sector i receives from selling allowances.
In equilibrium, if h c is positive, h d must be negative and vice versa, as is clear from (27). Substituting (28) into (26) and (27) respectively yields:
We now have a system of four equations: (29) for each sector i = c; d; (30) and (13).
This system can then be solved for the four unknown variables: n c ; n d ; h c and h d :
Thus, while the allowance price w as well as the sector-speci…c standards c and d
are not uniquely determined in equilibrium, the amount that each …rm receives from selling (or spends on buying) allowances per unit of output is determined.
We shall see that this system of four equations has two solutions, which can be compared on welfare. Since both solutions have the same level of emissions (L) in the long run equilibrium, they feature the same level of environmental damage. This implies that we can abstract from the environmental damage component in the welfare function explicitly.
Under both emissions trading schemes, output per …rm is given by (7) . From (2), (7) and (13), welfare for a given level L of total emissions, with q i = f i in both sectors is given by:
The …rst two terms between square brackets on the RHS denote the consumption utility from the good (the area below the inverse demand curve); the third term denotes aggregate variable cost, and the fourth term aggregate …xed cost. The second term on the RHS of (31) is the emissions constraint (13) and dirty …rms selling allowances to clean …rms.
2. Solution r leads to higher welfare than solution . (14) and (15) Next, let us compare welfare in both solutions r and for the numerical example (21) with L = 480: In Figure 2 , welfare in sector i with output Q i is given by the area between the demand curve p i (Q i ) and the long run average cost curve c+f . In solution r; welfare in the clean and dirty sector together is, respectively:
Solution r exists if and only if both inequalities
This exceeds welfare in solution ; which can be calculated in the same way as:
The intuition is as follows. Emissions trading via intensity standards inevitably leads to the subsidization and expansion of one sector (relative to the unconstrained benchmark), and the taxation and contraction of the other sector. It is better for the clean sector to expand, because this leads to a relatively small increase in emissions so that the dirty sector does not have to contract a lot in order to reach the desired emission level. By contrast, expansion of the dirty sector leads to a large emission increase, so that the clean sector has to contract signi…cantly.
Since solution r yields higher welfare than solution ; we shall assume from now on that the regulator will implement solution r where clean …rms sell allowances to dirty …rms. Thus, n 
Welfare comparison
In this section we compare welfare under the two emission trading policies. Since we are comparing cap-and-trade and intensity-based emissions trading for a given equal level of emissions, we can abstract from the environmental damage component in the welfare function explicitly. Welfare for a given level L of total emissions, with long run output per …rm q i = f i in both sectors, is given by (31) as explained in subsection 3.2. 11 We …nd that:
Proposition 3 Emissions trading via an absolute cap-and-trade scheme maximizes welfare for a given level of total emissions under the constraint that
Emissions trading via intensity standards results in too many clean …rms and too few dirty …rms. Figure 1 illustrates the optimality of cap-and-trade given that q i = f i : We know from section 3.1 that the long run cap-and-trade equilibrium for our numerical example (21) with L = 400 is Q d = 120 and Q c = 160: In Figure 1 , welfare in sector i with output Q i is given by the area between the demand curve p i (Q i ) and the long run 11 Without the zero-pro…t result that q i = f i (or any other constraints on q i ), the welfare optimum would feature n c and n d arbitrarily small (ignoring the integer constraint) or n c = n d = 1 (taking the integer constraint into account) in order to minimize aggregate …xed costs. average cost curve c + f . The sum of welfare in the dirty and clean sector respectively is then:
How would welfare change if we slightly decreased production of the dirty good and increased production of the clean good, so that total emissions remain at 400. Since d = 2 c ; we can increase clean output by twice the dirty output reduction. A marginal reduction in dirty output reduces welfare in Figure 1 by
increase in the production of the clean good raises welfare by 2M c T c = 80: Total welfare thus remains unchanged, which means that the long run cap-and-trade equilibrium must be the welfare optimum.
Emissions trading on the basis of intensity standards cannot implement the welfare optimum. As we know from subsection 3.2, the clean sector is subsidized and the dirty sector is taxed under such a system. Thus clean output is higher than in the unconstrained benchmark, and dirty output is lower. It is easily seen with the aid of Figure 1 that the optimal response to emission reduction is output reduction in both sectors. 12 This leads to higher welfare than output reduction in one sector only, which in turn is better than output reduction in one sector and output expansion in the other sector. Under a regime of intensity standards the dirty sector is ine¢ ciently small to compensate for the growth in the clean sector.
Conclusions
The design of markets for tradeable emission allowances can generally take two forms: and 'dirty') model with imperfectly competitive output markets, where we de…ne the clean sector as the sector with the highest 'value'per unit of emissions.
With intensity standards we allow the maximum allowed level of emissions per unit of output to di¤er between the two sectors. This means that the standard does not depend on the de…nition of a unit of output. We …nd that intensity standards could result in clean …rms selling allowances to dirty …rms, or in dirty …rms selling to clean …rms. Since the former outcome always yields higher welfare, we assumed that the regulator will set the standards so as to implement this outcome.
With free entry and exit driving pro…ts to zero, output per …rm in either of the two sectors does not depend on how emissions trading is organized but only depends on the …xed cost of producing in a sector. This is because a …rm faces constant full marginal cost, comprising both the production and pollution cost. It is shown that an absolute cap-and-trade regime always generates the …rst-best outcome in the long run, given the zero-pro…t output level per …rm with free entry and exit in the output market.
Emissions trading on the basis of relative intensity standards leads to too many clean …rms in the long run equilibrium, i.e., the size of the clean sector is too large compared to the size of the clean sector under cap-and-trade.
A Appendix

A.1 Normalization of the Slope of a Demand Function
The slope of the demand function for a good, when using conventional units for measuring the good as well as for money, is usually di¤erent from 1. In this appendix we show how to normalize the slopes of the demand functions for two goods (gasoline and coal) to 1 by changing the unit of measurement of the respective goods. We leave the money measurement intact, so that consumer surplus from the two goods can still be added together after normalization.
Suppose the inverse demand function for gasoline (gas) is:
with the quantity of gasoline Y gas measured in gallons and its price P gas in dollars per gallon. Thus the units on A and B are "$/gallon" and "$/(gallon) 2 " respectively.
Total revenue is P gas Y gas and units for total revenue are dollars. Now to normalize the demand function, we …rst divide both sides by b p B "1=b-gallons" per gallon (or equivalently, we multiply by 1=b gallons per "1=b-gallon"). The demand function then becomes:
p gas = gas bY gas with p gas P gas =b and gas A=b: Now p gas and gas are measured in "$ per 1=b-gallon" and b = B=b in "$=(gallon 1=b-gallon)". Finally, we introduce the quantity measure Q gas which is expressed in "1=b-gallon" so that Q gas = bY gas : This turns the demand function into:
p gas = gas gas Q gas ;
with gas = $1=(1=b-gallon) 2 . The slope of the demand function is now 1:
As a speci…c example, let us set A = $500=gallon and B = $100=(gallon) 2 in P gas = A BY gas . This means the vertical intercept is $500 per gallon and the horizontal intercept is 5 gallons. Writing the unit of measurement below each parameter and variable, we have:
Multiplying the left-hand side and the right-hand side by 0.1 gallon/decigallon yields: (P gas 0:1) = (500 0:1) (100 0:1
Simplifying and noting that Y gas = 0:1Q gas yields:
Simplifying this gives:
After normalization, the vertical intercept is $50 per decigallon and the horizontal intercept is 50 decigallons.
In the same way, let the inverse demand function for coal be P coal = C DY coal with the quantity of coal measured in tons and its price in dollars per ton. We normalize this demand function to p coal = coal Q coal with p coal P coal =d; coal C=d and Q coal dY k where d p D: Now the quantity of coal is measured in "1=d-tons" and its price in dollars per 1=d-ton. As a speci…c example, let us set C = $100 per ton and
This means the vertical intercept is $100 per ton and the horizontal intercept is 25 tons. We normalize this demand function by expressing the quantity of coal Q coal in "half tons," with its price p coal expressed in dollar per half ton. After normalization the demand curve is p coal = 50 Q coal . The vertical intercept is $50 per half ton and the horizontal intercept is 50 half tons.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2.1 There are two solutions to equations (29) for each sector i = c; d; (13) and (30) which we shall denote by r and : Solution r is:
with E > L being the unconstrained emissions given by (11) and i by (9) . We see Solution is:
We see that h c in (A2a) is negative, i.e., clean …rms are buying allowances so that n c < n c by (10) 
Substituting (A1c) and (A1d) into (A3) yields:
Substituting (A2c) and (A2d) into (A3) yields:
By de…nition (12), W r > W : 
Substituting (A4) into (A1c) yields, using Proposition 1: 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Maximizing welfare (31) with respect to n i (i = c; d) yields:
This is the same condition as the …rst-order condition under the cap-and-trade regime, substituting (7) and (16) into (4) . The shadow price of emissions in (A5) therefore equals the allowance price v in (17) , and n i in (A5) equals n A i in (18) . This means that a cap-and-trade scheme implements the welfare optimum for a given level of total emissions with q i = f i : Combining (19) and Proposition 2.1, we …nd n 
The highest possible value of Q d in (A6) and (A7) is where the term under the square root is zero:
The Q + c solution (A6) includes the unconstrained benchmark, since Q + c ( d ) = c : Substituting (A6) into (13), we …nd that total emissions are:
The …rst and second derivatives are:
< 0:
(A10) 13 The other solution Q From (A8) and (A10) we …nd:
In our numerical example (21), this becomes: 
